Operation AVALANCHE 1943

OPERATION AVALANCHE

9-18th SEPTEMBER 1943

By Lt Col George A Gelder RM (Retd) RM Corps Historian

9 September marks the anniversary of the landings at Salerno, 41 Commando’s unit memorable date, as well as a significant anniversary for Number 2 Army Commando. This narrative which covers the actions of both Commandos has been condensed from the Official History of the Commandos in the Mediterranean September 1943 to May 1945. Following fast on the heels of the successful invasion of Sicily, Operation Avalanche was an assault landing in the Bay of Salerno by the Fifth American Army, consisting of the VI US Corps on the right and the 10th BR Corps on the left, the object of which was the capture of Naples. 10 BR Corps was tasked with seizing the plain and city of Naples. North of the initial landing area, a line of hills running east to west immediately north of Salerno cuts off Salerno Bay from Naples. The shortest route to Naples from the landing area runs through the towns of Salerno and Vietri and then turns north-westwards into those hills through the defiles of La Molina and Nocera, from where it emerges on to the Naples plain. To enable the advance of 10 Corps, it was decided to land two Commandos at Marina Di Vietri with the tasks of destroying the coastal defence batteries that covered the western portion of the Bay of Salerno, and of seizing and holding the defile of La Molina until 46 Div, the left division of 10 Corps, passed through. At the same, time three battalions of US Rangers were to land several miles west of Marina at Maiori and pass inland to seize and hold the Nocera defile. This plan it was hoped, would immediately open the road to Naples after the initial landing and that 46 Div would be able to push through the defiles one or two days after landing.

The Special Service (SS) Bde HQ (Brigadier R E Laycock DSO), No 2 Army Commando and 41 RM Cdo were allotted to 10 Corps for the operation. In addition to the Commandos, the Brigade was allotted a troop of 6 pounder anti-tank guns from 196 Bty 73 ATk Regt, one company of six 4.2 inch mortars from 83rd US Chem Mor Bn and two detachments of a Field Ambulance. The allotment of landing craft was similarly generous: one LSI (Prince Albert) carrying 6 LCA was allotted to 2 Cdo and Bde HQ, 2 LCI(L) to 41 Cdo, one LCI(L) to the anti-tank gun troop, and one LCT to the US mortar company. Finally, a minesweeper, Landing Craft Gun (LCG) and the Hunt Class destroyer HMS Blackmoor were provided for escort and support duties during the landing. A follow-up LST was also arranged to bring forward transport and additional men and stores several days after the initial landing. The brigade plan was for the first wave of troops consisting of 210 all ranks of 2 Cdo (Lt Col J Churchill MC) to land at Marina in 5 LCA at 0330hrs on 9 September. Covered by fire from the destroyer and the LCG, this force was to secure a beachhead, assault and capture the coastal defence battery at Marina and then hold the beachhead and the coast road running west from Marina, while the remainder of the force landed. Subsequently 2 Cdo was to send two troops to operate against the western approaches of Salerno. Following this first landing in the LCAs, the whole of 41 Cdo and Bde HQ were to land. 41 Cdo's task was to seize the defile of La Molina, on the way detaching two troops to clear the town of Vietri. During the landing by 41 Cdo, the LCA which had taken the first wave of 2 Cdo were to return to Prince Albert to collect the remainder of 2 Cdo who would form the third wave. The fourth wave would consist of the LCI carrying the 6-pounder anti-tank gun troop and the LCT bringing the US 4.2 mortar company. Finally, the LCA were to land rations, reserve ammunition and extra clothing and necessities for the brigade.

The commando force that embarked at Palermo in Sicily on 7 September comprised 338 all ranks for 2 Cdo and approximately 400 all ranks in 41 Cdo. at 0215hrs on 9 September their convoy reached the naval assault area and Prince Albert immediately began to lower her LCA. 2 Commando in 5 LCA headed straight for Marina beach led in by the minesweeper, HMS Blackmoor and the LCG. At 0320hrs, H-10 minutes, the destroyer and LCG began the preliminary bombardment of the beach area and the coastal defence battery. At 0330hrs, H Hour, 2 Cdo landed unopposed on Marina beach. One troop immediately formed a beachhead, mortars were set in position on the beach, and the remainder of the force formed up to assault the battery. The battery was situated on the high ground overlooking the beach itself, and Lt Col Churchill planned to assault it from the northeast, the inland side, under cover of fire from his mortars. This plan was carried out, but the battery was found to be undefended, although some prisoners were captured in the vicinity. At 0350hrs, 41 Cdo (Lt Col B D Lumsden RM) and Bde HQ landed without incident. 41 Cdo moved off through 2 Cdo to Vietri and La Molina. Vietri was found to be mainly unoccupied by the enemy, but some resistance was encountered in the valley leading north from the town towards La Molina. It was here that at about half an hour before first light, a German Mk IV tank, apparently on reconnaissance, came south down the road and was destroyed by B Troop. At dawn, HQ 2 Cdo and Bde HQ moved into Vietri and established themselves in a former German barracks which bore all the signs of a hasty evacuation. Communication was established between with 46 Div and 2 Cdo quickly reorganised and despatched two troops to operate against the western approaches to Salerno. The remaining three troops came into brigade reserve, while one troop remained to cover the beachhead and the coast road to the west, and to supervise the unloading of the remaining craft. As this reorganisation continued, the remainder of 2 Cdo landed and quickly moved up to join the rest of the Commando. There were still isolated groups of Germans in the Marina-Vietri area, and the mopping up of these bewildered stragglers continued throughout the morning. The two troops of 41 Cdo detailed for the purpose had now cleared Vietri and moved off to rejoin their unit south of La Molina so that the whole of 41 Cdo was now in the pass, established in a defensive position in the hills overlooking the road from either side. As 138 Bde, the left assault bde of 46 Div, landed immediately south of Salerno, the command of the SS Bde passed to Commander 138 Bde. However, 138 Bde was held up on the eastern outskirts of Salerno, and the two troops of 2 Cdo operating against the western exits of the town also began to meet increasing opposition as the Germans tried to break out of the town westwards towards Vietri. At about midday a Tiger tank probed these two troops, causing some casualties, until it received two direct hits at about 900 yards range from one of the 6 pounder anti-tank guns of 73 ATk Regt, after which it withdrew into Salerno and did not reappear. A second tank was hit twice with PIAT rounds and it also withdrew. Later, the Germans again attempted to break through 2 Cdo's position west of Salerno, but this attempt was never pushed home with any energy and 2 Cdo's position was never really in danger.

As the day wore on, the size of the problem facing 138 Bde and the SS Bde became clear. The Germans were holding the town of Salerno against 138 Bde to the east and the commandos to the west, and their positions here were backed up by strong forces holding the road running north from Salerno towards Avellino. Further west, La Molina was held in some strength and the Germans were vigorously resisting any advance by 41 Cdo. There also appeared to be strong forces in Cava and armour had been seen at one time or another during the day in this area. German intentions to stabilise their position became apparent during the morning when the beach and the towns of Marina and Vietri were very heavily mortared. On the beach, one LCT was hit twice, and the LCAs carrying ammunition and reserve supplies, including the men’s packs, turned tail and returned to Prince Albert without unloading. Because the mortaring had been so heavy, it was reported that the beach had been lost. More importantly, the LCA never returned to the beach and for the next 9 days, the commando units fought without the comfort of their large packs and in the sure knowledge that their contents would be looted.

The planned linkup between the SS Bde and 138 Bde had been due to take place in Salerno during the morning of D Day, but Brig Laycock was told that it was unlikely before at least 1500hrs. This was the first indication to the Commandos that 46 Div was encountering difficulties in the main beachhead. At 2030hrs, 138 Bde’s recce sqn from 44 Recce Regt passed through Salerno to join 41 Cdo at La Molina. Hopes were therefore high that 10 September would see 46 Div through the defile. At dawn on D+1, after a surprisingly quiet night, the recce sqn pushed forward from 41 Cdo's positions south of La Molina. There they found the Germans strongly entrenched across the pass. Some of their positions actually overlooked 41 Cdo's positions from hills above the valley, and their armour was held in readiness to operate along the road. In these circumstances, the recce sqn decided it could do nothing, and it withdrew to rejoin 138 Bde in Salerno. At 0715hrs, Commander 138 Bde visited Brig Laycock in Vietri to reveal that he was unable to reinforce the Commandos or to come to their immediate assistance or relief, but he hoped that they could hold on to their present positions until the general situation improved. In return, Laycock requested naval fire support against the enemy concentrations in Molina and Cava, and for urgent resupply of wireless batteries and mortar ammunition. At 1000hrs, 41 Cdo reported enemy infiltration forward against their positions south of Molina, and the 4.2-inch mortars were ordered to move up in support of the Commando. At 1025hrs, A Tp 41 Cdo, on the west of the valley, south of La Molina, reported being heavily attacked and X Tp in the same area reported German infantry entering the village below its position. The enemy slowly crept forward on the wooded slopes of the defile while heavily mortaring and machine-gunning 41 Cdo's positions from concealed posts 3000 to 4000 yards away. At 1100hrs, and in the middle of the battle, a party of Germans appeared on the skyline of a hill overlooking Vietri from the north and opened fire with MMGs on troops moving in the streets of Vietri. CO 2 Cdo ordered his 3-inch mortars to engage this party and he directed the fire of LMGs on to them from the roof of Bde HQ. The party soon withdrew, nevertheless such an incident could not be ignored and it was decided to occupy the heights overlooking Vietri, for which two troops of 2 Cdo were detailed. This left the heavy weapons troop as the only brigade reserve force. These two troops had to climb precipitous hills of over 1300 feet to establish a proper perimeter around Vietri, and the maintenance of essential supplies to these heights became a considerable undertaking, involving much labour and fatigue.

The hilly nature of the country demanded more infantry than was available from within SS Bde resources. Each hill required a piquet, and the close country so restricted fields of view and fire that the only means of preventing infiltration was to have posts close to each other. A further request for more infantry was made to 138 Bde, but they remained fully committed in Salerno. They did however, send MMGs and 4.2-inch mortars from 138 Bde Support Group which were immediately used to thicken up the fire support to the Commandos. Throughout the morning of 10 September, 41 Cdo withstood repeated attempts by the Germans to break through their positions south of La Molina. Some infiltration occurred, mainly around their flanks, but on too small a scale to influence the general position, especially as the two troops of 2 Cdo in the hills north of Vietri now gave their positions considerable depth. They were, however, continually engaged and even 2 Cdo’s troops behind them had considerable fighting to do, but although there were casualties, all positions were maintained. At 1430hrs the forward troops of 41 Cdo and Vietri were heavily shelled and mortared in preparation for a large-scale attack. At 1635hrs, another heavy concentration of shellfire fell on Vietri and on HQ 41 Cdo where the CO and the Signals Officer were wounded and severe casualties were caused among the signals personnel. Radio equipment and signallers had to be replaced from Bde HQ resources, and Maj Edwards, the second in command of 41 Cdo, took over command of the unit. About fifteen minutes later, A Tp 41 Cdo was again heavily attacked and was in danger of being overrun. Q Tp was ordered forward to counterattack the enemy who were moving forward on a wide front on the slopes of the hills on the west of the valley and who were passing above and between the troop positions of 41 Cdo. Q Tp’s counter attack achieved partial success in that it temporarily stopped the infiltration of the enemy between A Tp and the rest of 41 Cdo, and a new line was established some 200 yards in rear of the Commando’s former position. The left flank of the Commando remained exposed and the threat of an outflanking movement by the Germans remained a serious threat. The position was safe until dusk, but unless the flank could be secured before nightfall, there was nothing to stop the enemy penetrating to 2 Cdo’s positions around Vietri during darkness. Once there in strength, 2 Cdo would be too thin on the ground to prevent infiltration into Vietri itself. 138 Bde was again asked for infantry support. This time, 6th Bn Lincolnshire Regt was sent to assist, but they were unable to mount an attack before darkness. They did, however, send one company to thicken up 2 Cdo’s positions immediately north of Vietri as well as relieve 2 Cdo’s two troops on the western approaches to Salerno. In that way, three troops of 2 Cdo were freed for the attack to secure the ridge to the west of 41 Cdo’s positions which overlooked their left flank. A section of tanks which had been sent with 6th Lincs was detailed to provide fire support. The assault went in before dusk and was completely successful. The ridge was secured and a stop was put to the infiltration by the Germans on 41 Cdo’s left flank.

The night of the 10/11 September was again comparatively quiet, and no major changes of position occurred. The next day, 2 companies of the KOYLI arrived to reinforce the brigade. These companies were sent up to positions sited in depth behind 2 Cdo’s positions on the left flank of 41 Cdo. This released one troop of 2 Cdo to reinforce 41 Cdo’s line in the valley. The position was now held as follows: 41 Cdo reinforced by one troop of 2 Cdo, held positions south of La Molina in the valley and to the east of it. On their left were two troops of 2 Cdo. Behind the line of these troops, and supporting them in depth, were two companies of the KOYLI and on the east, one company of 6th Lincs and one troop of 2 Cdo. The fifth line troop of 2 Cdo was still in the Marina area, and the Heavy Weapons Tp of 2 Cdo was employed along with all the available mortars and machine guns in a coordinated defensive fire plan. The remainder of the 6th Lincs were disposed along the Vietri-Salerno road on the right flank of the SS Bde’s front. These positions were maintained throughout the day, which was also largely uneventful. At dusk both Commandos were relieved by 6th Lincs and the KOYLI and went into reserve between Vietri and Salerno where it was hoped to give them a short rest, but it was not until after midnight that the last men reached the rest area. Salerno and Vietri were shelled and mortared during the night and at dawn on September 12th the Germans began an attack against 138 Bde’s positions north of Salerno from the direction of Avellino. This attack was successfully held, but further attacks were threatened, and the enemy kept up an unrelenting pressure in this sector. At 0830hrs, both 2 and 41 Cdos were again ordered back into the line to relieve 6th Lincs and the KOYLI, and at 0930hrs the units moved forward to reoccupy their former positions. 41 Cdo again held the valley south of La Molina and the hills on the right of it, while 2 Cdo occupied the hills to the left of 41 Cdo and high ground immediately north of Vietri, supporting the forward troops in depth. No 2 Cdo now covered the left flank only from the hills above Vietri, while on the right flank the inter brigade boundary ran only a few hundred yards east of Vietri. The front had thus been narrowed as much as possible to reflect the lack of men. Casualties were by this time beginning to deplete the Commandos considerably. 41 Cdo had lost 11 officers and 74 other ranks and 2 Cdo had lost one officer and 33 other ranks. At so depleted a state, the units could only manage to hold their positions in depth in such a way as to create a reserve of one troop each in case of an attack from any one direction. The brigade had no additional reserves and could only coordinate the work of the 4.2 in mortars and 6 pounder ATk guns under its command to produce the maximum support, although additional support was available on call from 46 Div Artillery.

The remainder of 12 September passed uneventfully; the valley was mortared and shelled from time to time, and the viaduct carrying the road out of Vietri came under heavy MG fire at long range, but no major incidents occurred until dawn 13 Sep when 2 Cdo was attacked under cover of a severe mortar and artillery barrage from the front and on both flanks. Their forward two troops on the left were out of touch with Cdo HQ and the commanders of both troops on the right were killed. On the left flank, it appeared that the Commando was being overrun, while on the right, the enemy infiltrated above and to the left of 41 Cdo’s position into the village of Dragone. From Dragone the Germans moved south east onto a hill from where they could fire onto the rear of 2 Cdo’s positions. Fire support was immediately called for, and 71 Fd Regt replied with intense and extremely accurate defensive fire. 2 Cdo stood their ground and fought back magnificently, though two of their forward troops were overrun and their flanks were turned. 41 Cdo was ordered to send one troop to assist 2 Cdo, and CO 2 Cdo ordered this troop and one of his own to counter attack under the command of his second in command, Major Lawrie. While this counter attack was being mounted, Maj Lawrie was killed and Maj Edwards, commanding 41 Cdo, had to take the force forward. This counter attack proved the turning point in the battle. The enemy advance was stopped and by 1200hrs, they began to retire under cover of smoke. By 1330hrs, all original positions had been retaken and 2 Cdo settled down to reorganise and evacuate its wounded. For some hours, mortaring of the hill continued, but the enemy did not return. The battle of Dragone Hill was the last major attack by the enemy down the valley of La Molina towards Vietri. After this defeat, the pressure, not only on 2 Cdo’s front, but also on 41 Cdo was considerably reduced. The Germans had been decisively beaten. This defeat had been greatly assisted by the magnificent work of the artillery, but it would never have been achieved without the stubborn refusal by 2 Cdo to give ground or cease resisting. No 2 Cdo lost 5 officers killed, one officer wounded and 17 OR’s killed and 49 wounded, all in the course of a single morning, 72 casualties out of 316 men in a few hours; nearly one quarter of the unit. This battle was one of courageous tenacity almost unexampled, even among commandos. After such heavy casualties, the brigade was withdrawn into Salerno at dusk that same night to rest and reorganise. The relief was carried out without incident by units of 138 Bde, although two troops of 41 Cdo were not relieved until the following afternoon. During the night 13/14 September, the brigade was ordered to take over responsibility for the area immediately north of Salerno, which included the hill feature known as the “Castle”, and the adjacent valleys to the east and west of it. 2 Cdo remained in reserve in billets in Salerno. 41 Cdo was placed under direct command of 138 Bde as a reserve for the Vietri sector. 14 September was a comparatively quiet day, although the enemy was active on all fronts and contact was maintained. Some anxiety was felt about the continued pressure in the La Molina area, but no major attack developed and 41 Cdo was not committed. The Commandos were therefore able to rest and look to their own internal reorganisation. 15 September began as a quiet day, but in the late afternoon orders were received that both Commandos were to come under command 167 Inf Bde of 56 (London) Div and move as quickly as possible to Mercatello, a village some two and a half miles east of Salerno on the coast road. The Germans had seized three prominent hill features which overlooked the beachhead defences, and critically, from which they threatened to cut the whole beachhead in half.

These hill features dominated the village of Piegolelle which is reached by a narrow lane winding upwards to the village from Mercatello. At the village, the track turns southwestward and runs along the hills into Salerno. To the east of the village a huge crag, later known as 41 Cdo Hill, rises sharply from the roadside. To the east, a narrow re-entrant forms a small valley around which the road curves and in which the village lies. Beyond this valley is a long ridge running northeast to southwest which links the two high points. The north-easterly point was called the “Pimple” and south-westerly “White Cross Hill”. The Germans had seized the village of Piegolelle, the Pimple and 41 Cdo Hill and driven the British troops back into the lower hills nearer the coast. 41 Cdo was therefore ordered to attack and capture 41 Cdo Hill, while 2 Cdo was ordered to search the valley to the east of it as far as the Pimple and including the village of Piegolelle. On D+6 at approximately 1730hrs, 41 Cdo moved forward to start their attack against 41 Cdo Hill. A troop of Sherman tanks carrying one troop from the commando led the way, but one of these tanks crashed through a bridge shortly after crossing the Start Line, and the remaining two got stuck about a mile short of the objective. 41 Cdo was therefore forced to press on without any armour. They advanced onto their objective under a well-directed artillery concentration, securing it with the loss of only 3 casualties. They immediately consolidated their position, but no counter attack followed. For 41 Cdo, it was perhaps their lucky day, as this was the only occasion at Salerno where any task was easier to perform than there was any right to expect.

No 2 Cdo began their sweep up the valley on 41 Cdo’s left flank at 1830hrs, one hour after 41 Cdo’s attack had started. The moon had not yet risen; the night was extremely dark and the country was broken and irregular vine-covered terraced slopes and rocky hillsides. It was country over which silent movement was well-nigh impossible, and which coupled with 41 Cdo’s attack on the right, was bound to make the enemy in the valley both alert and nervous. But although surprise would therefore have been difficult to achieve, its advantages were questionable as the object of the sweep was to find the enemy and clear him out of the valley, not to creep past him unnoticed. Gauging that noise properly used gives confidence at night and greatly assists control while preventing separation, loss of direction and position, CO 2 Cdo decided that the best way to find the enemy was to frighten him into betraying his positions. Considering all these factors, he decided to organise his sweep in six parallel troop columns, with his HQ in the centre, each column keeping touch with its neighbours by shouting “Commando”, and the whole party taking its direction from Cdo HQ in the centre. In this novel way, the advance was carried out. The troops could be heard crashing through the undergrowth and yelling “Commando” as they swept forward. The Germans, unable to see their attackers in the darkness and overwhelmingly conscious of the wide spread of the advance, were caught like fish in a net, and for the most part, surrendered without a fight. Moving with commendable speed, the commandos swept up the valley through the village of Piegolelle and on to the Pimple, and then back again through the valley to their Start Line. At midnight, tired but triumphant they reached their own lines once again with 136 prisoners, more than the whole of 46 Div had taken to date. But 2 Commando was to have no rest after their triumphant labours; an immediate follow up was demanded, and because no other troops were available, 2 Cdo were ordered to return up the valley and to take and hold the village of Piegolelle and the Pimple. At 0130hrs on 16 September, 2 Cdo once again moved forward, this time using the narrow lane. The moon was now up and visibility was good up to 100m or so. Before they reached Piegolelle, the Commando met German resistance which increased with every step. Positions on the Pimple and White Cross Hill proved the most dangerous and the volume of fire from these positions mounted as 2 Cdo advanced. After close fighting amongst the houses, Piegolelle was again captured and contact was made with 41 Cdo on the right. A line was established covering the village and 41 Cdo Hill, while two troops of 2 Cdo were sent forward to attack the Pimple. Resistance on this feature was intense and crushing MG fire met the attackers as well as a hail of grenades. The troop commander, Captain the Duke of Wellington was killed and many of his troop were also killed and wounded. Courage alone could not take the hill, and the remnants of the two troops were finally forced to withdraw to Piegolelle.

The morning of 16 September found 41 Cdo and 2 Cdo firmly holding a line from inclusive Piegolelle to inclusive 41 Cdo Hill, but being hard pressed by enemy positions dug in on the thickly wooded slopes of the Pimple and the ridge running southwest from this feature to White Cross Hill. Throughout the day, both Commandos held on grimly to their positions, their losses steadily mounting. It was decided that the Pimple should again be attacked that evening by 138 Bde under covering fire from the Commandos and the Div Arty. In the evening this plan was suddenly changed and 41 Cdo was ordered to carry out the attack. H Hour for their attack was fixed at 0200hrs on 17 September. This gave very little time for detailed planning and both officers and men were extremely tired after the distances covered and the hard fighting of the previous 24 hrs; as a result, preparations for the attack were somewhat sketchy. It was arranged that 46 Div Arty should fire an intensive barrage onto the objective for 11 minutes preceding the attack, and that the Commando would advance as it lifted. Maj Edwards, commanding 41 Cdo, moved his unit forward from 41 Cdo Hill through Piegolelle and then to a Start Line west of the village, about 300 yards south of the Pimple. This move was just being completed when the artillery concentration was brought down, not on the objective, but right across 41 Cdo’s FUP. The men went to ground in any cover they could find, but casualties were heavy, and included Maj Edwards who was mortally wounded, his signaller killed and the control set destroyed. Whatever caused this mistake, the mistake once made ruined any chance of success the attack may have had. 41 Cdo pressed home the attack, but to no avail and they returned to their former positions on 41 Cdo Hill exhausted and shaken. Unfortunately, the order to withdraw did not reach B Tp, which moved forward up onto the Pimple after the barrage had lifted. They were met with some enemy fire, but succeeded in driving the enemy away from the top of the hill and occupying it themselves. There they remained until 1000hrs the following day when a fresh order to withdraw reached them and they rejoined the rest of the unit. During the time they were on the Pimple, it was subjected to heavy fire and several counterattacks, all of which were repulsed.

The morning of 17th September found the Commandos in the same positions as on the previous day; 41 Cdo on their hill and 2 Cdo still in and around Piegolelle village. By this time, HQ SS Bde had been relieved of their responsibility for the sector of the line immediately north of Salerno and were now able to send the company of US 4.2 mortars which was still under their command to reinforce 2 Cdo. With their help, and using all their own available weapons, 2 Cdo kept a vigorous mortar and machine gun fire on the enemy’s positions. The enemy returned the fire, at first with interest, but it was clear that they were suffering casualties, for their fire gradually decreased. On the night 17/18 September, 41 Cdo was withdrawn some 400 yards from their hill position to another feature southwest of it and were replaced in the line by the Ox & Bucks Light Infantry. 18 September brought yet another attack on the Pimple and White Cross Hill by an infantry brigade, but again these features were not captured, although the attack enjoyed some limited success. 2 Cdo therefore continued to pound the Pimple with mortar and MG fire, and by nightfall no return fire was experienced. During that night, both Commandos were relieved in place and withdrawn into reserve in the Mercatello area where they again came under command of the SS Bde. Fresh troops who had relieved 2 Cdo went forward on 19 September and found the Pimple deserted, but strewn with enemy dead. 2 Cdo had not remained in the line long enough to see the results of their “offensive defence”, but the effect was there and the benefits of their policy were reaped by the troops which relieved them.

The Commandos did not go into action again at Salerno but returned to Sicily to rest and reorganise. Their operations at Salerno had been costly; they had lost 13 officers and 54 other ranks killed, 15 officers and 225 other ranks wounded and 1 officer and 59 ranks missing. This total of 367 all ranks represents 48% of the two Commandos as they landed on 9 September at Marina. Yet the Commandos had achieved much. The casualties they inflicted on the enemy were not inconsiderable, but their achievement does not rest on that fact alone. Their defence of La Molina pass against repeated attacks by enemy forces superior to them in every way was in itself sufficient to bring them everlasting honour and glory. But they had, in addition, saved a critical situation at Piegolelle and helped finally turn that situation to the advantage of the landing forces. The remarkable and original sweep by 2 Commando in this area was in itself a notable achievement, but the bitter fighting that followed it was the true test of endurance and courage. They had achieved much and dared all. 2 Cdo remained in Italy, eventually moving to the Adriatic and 41 Cdo returned to the UK via Sicily and North Africa, arriving in Gourock on the Clyde on 4 January 44, from where they moved to Kent to begin their preparations and training for the invasion of France in June of that year.