South Georgia 1982 and Operation PARAQUAT

What Really Happened in South Georgia on Op PARAQUAT in 1982

By Lieutenant Colonel Guy Sheridan OBE RM

A copy of the London Gazette announcing the awards for the Falklands Campaign was sent to me three years after the war to ask if I had seen it and what did I think of it? I did not respond. As I was the designated commander of the landing forces (CLF) charged with repossessing South Georgia I decided to place in writing, for the record, actually what went on in April 1982. The account which follows is a transcript of what I wrote at the time. After over 36 years of continued misrepresentation in official and media accounts of how South Georgia was recaptured, I believe I owe it to all those I commanded as CLF on 25 April 1982 - including SAS and SBS who were directly under my command during the landings - to clarify what happened. The footnotes were added recently.

TRANSCRIPT OF MY ORIGINAL STATEMENT WRITTEN IN THE AUTUMN OF 1985

During the morning of 12 April 1982 RFA Fort Austin made a rendezvous with a Task Group south of Ascension Island. The Task Group (TG) consisted of HMS Antrim, HMS Plymouth and RFA Tidespring. The Commander Task Group (CTG) was Captain Young of HMS Antrim. Spread between Antrim but with the bulk on Tidespring was M Company (Coy) Group (Gp), 42 Commando RM commanded by Captain CJ Nunn RM which had been designated the landing force for the operation with myself in overall command of the military forces. Included were the Naval Gunfire Support Forward Observation (NGSFO) officers from 148 Commando Battery, Royal Artillery.

Unbeknown to me and CTG, D Sqn of 22 SAS had been told to transfer to the TG from RFA Fort Austin. It was not clear at this point who had ordered this transfer and involvement of the SAS in Op Paraquet but not only did it come as a complete surprise to me but it also created confusion within the RN. No formal notification of any augmentation to my force had been given although I had been informed in a hand-written note at Ascension that 2 SBS would be joining and that the Mountain Troop of D Sqn might be allocated. I had no need for any SAS let alone a Sqn because I could rely on my own extensive mountaineering and Arctic experience and within M Coy Gp I had two reconnaissance sections each with three experienced Mountain Leaders who were more than capable for reconnaissance tasks on the mountainous and heavily glaciated island of South Georgia. In addition, M Coy Gp had just spent three months’ Mountain and Arctic Warfare training in North Norway and were thus current and also very capable of operating in the winter environment of the island.

During the morning of 14 April 1982 I was ordered by CTG to begin planning for covert reconnaissance of Grytviken and Leith to determine Argentine military dispositions and strengths using the forces at my disposal (see copy of Young’s order to me available on request from the Editor). Any plan I made was to be agreed with CTG and no insertion of covert patrols was to be mounted before 211800Z Apr 82. Information from the covert patrols was to be used to plan landings with forces at my disposal to capture Grytviken and Leith, neutralise Argentine communications in the area, capture or kill Argentine armed forces personnel and arrest and remove Argentine civilians – all to be achieved with the minimum loss of life and damage to property. Later that day after I had prepared my orders I gave them to OC D Sqn and OC 2 SBS in the presence of CTG, Capt Nunn and Lt Grant SBS. I had decided that the SAS would have the Leith objective and 2 SBS would deal with Grytviken and King Edward Point (KEP). The intelligence that I had from HMS Endurance, now part of the TG, indicated that Grytviken and KEP together should be the main objective and that Leith was an objective that could be ‘dealt with later’. In my orders I stressed to SAS and SBS to keep well clear of glaciers.

OC D Sqn selected his Mountain Troop for the reconnaissance of Leith and planning began. At the same time OC 2 SBS began his planning for Grytviken and KEP. During the morning of 20 April on Antrim OC Mountain Troop gave his orders in the presence of myself and CTG at the same time as OC 2 SBS gave his on board Endurance. To my consternation, his concept was to land high on the Fortuna Glacier and move over heavily crevassed terrain before descending off the glacier to approach Leith over lower ground. I did not like the plan for landing on the glacier particularly as I had stressed the need to keep clear of them in my original orders. After the orders I asked to see CTG in his cabin where I advised him not to authorise Mountain Troop’s plan to land on the Fortuna Glacier. There were good reasons for this and I told CTG – the southern winter had already established itself; any bad weather high on a glaciated plateau was no place for helicopters; the troop had no experience of movement on glaciated and multi-crevassed terrain with heavy loads and had no M&AW training behind them. Either CTG ignored my advice or the SAS convinced him the Fortuna was feasible, or a combination of both. I was overruled and the Fortuna plan was duly authorised by CTG.

During the early afternoon of 21 April the Mountain Troop was landed by three Wessex helicopters in marginal weather high on the Fortuna Glacier. 2 SBS landed from Endurance in Hound Bay the next day for their task. At about 1100 on 22 April OC Mountain Troop radioed to say that they had been unable to move from their insertion point due to atrocious weather, that they were suffering environmental casualties after their tents were damaged by the wind, and that they needed immediate extraction. There followed a rescue mission which resulted in the crash of two Wessex helicopters high on the Fortuna Glacier and, later that day, the extraction of the complete Mountain Troop with their personal weapons together with the crews of the crashed helicopters, in a remarkable and courageous demonstration of flying. The bulk of the troop’s equipment was left on the glacier and therefore temporarily lost. The crash of the two helicopters had removed my most important and valued assets to land M Coy Gp ashore when the time came. After this setback I talked through an alternative plan with CTG who now authorised the launch of Boat Troop of D Sqn to proceed to Grass Island in Stromness Bay with the same mission as that of the Mountain Troop.

Crash Site Fortuna Glacier 28 April 1982

The troop was launched in Gemini inflatables at 0300 on 23 April with a favourable weather forecast for the 2 km passage in small boats. The five Gemini craft were lowered into the calm, oily sea of Stromness Bay in good, clear, starlit weather and Antrim, in complete darkened ship state, retreated into the night over the horizon to the open sea - the covert nature of all activities was still believed to be uncompromised. Before dawn an offshore breeze began increasing well out at sea to Force 4 recorded by Antrim. Not long after first light the OC of the Boat Troop radioed to say that two of his boats were missing and to confirm that he and the remainder of his men were established on Grass Island and were observing Leith. It turned out later that day that two of the Geminis had lost power in their outboard engines shortly after leaving Antrim and the attempts of the crews to paddle them to Grass Island had been thwarted by the offshore breeze. Where these two boats were was not known at this time but the overwhelming factor for me on Antrim was I had to assume that the covert nature of the whole operation had been compromised. I told CTG that I now needed to go back to the drawing board and revise my plans accordingly and that we should consider use of the quick reaction force put together by Capt Nunn to withdraw the Boat Troop. Although we did not know at this time, one of the Geminis managed to make landfall on Busen Point with the crew going to ground there while the second was blown out to sea in the rising breeze.

It was at about this time that CTG had been alerted to the presence of an Argentine submarine, the Santa Fe. Antrim’s Wessex had been refitted with all its anti-submarine electronic equipment and had launched to search the area for the submarine. On the way they spotted a Gemini well out to sea and winched three cold and frightened troopers up into the helicopter to return them to Antrim. Fortune had shone on these three men and it was chance that they were found. During a debriefing in Antrim’s Wardroom which I attended, it emerged that they had no clear instructions on what to do if outboard engines failed and if they became separated from each other. In view of the covert nature of their launching the previous night I was dismayed to hear that there were no specific orders to cover this eventuality. It begged the question ‘Why hadn’t the three working craft taken them in tow?’ From this time onwards, the pace and focus of naval operations was anti-submarine. I still had no information on Argentine dispositions at Leith. Because 2 SBS had been thwarted by wind and ice on their way across Cumberland East Bay to Dartmouth Point, I was still no wiser concerning what was at KEP and Grytviken and now that the covert nature of the operation had been compromised, any plans I made for a landing would need to reflect this.

The presence of an enemy submarine now dominated all naval activities and there was little we could do within the landing force except to discuss the options open to us once those anti-submarine activities ceased. This included the use of HMS Endurance, agreed by her charismatic Captain, to place her reinforced bow on Hope Point near KEP to land troops in darkness down scramble ropes onto the shore. At this time I was beginning to conclude that the Sqn’s recent role and deployment in Africa had significantly undermined the skills needed here in mountain and winter warfare and boat operations.

Anti-submarine activities had continued during 24 April and the TG had been augmented by HMS Brilliant, a modern anti-submarine frigate with two Lynx helicopters, after a fast passage down from the Falkland Islands total exclusion zone. Just after 0900 on 25 April I was summoned on Antrim’s public-address system to the radio room in the depths of the ship to take a surprising call from the CO of 22 SAS in which he suggested that I was frustrating his squadron’s activities. I then realised for the first time – and with deep disappointment – that this meant that the SAS had been going behind my back and I declined to discuss the matter. I deliberately replaced the phone. As I walked up to my ops room after that call, the public-address system sounded action stations and announced that her Wessex helicopter was attacking a submarine on the surface as it steamed out of Cumberland East Bay from KEP. Events now moved very rapidly and there were important things to see to.

The attack on the submarine is well documented elsewhere. Suffice to say, its return in a damaged condition to KEP to tie up alongside the jetty meant that the crew would now reinforce the garrison which, only a few hours before, had been reinforced by the submarine with more Argentine Marines. The initiative was ours. The opportunity to catch the garrison at KEP off balance had arrived and although I was still no wiser of the Argentine strengths and dispositions at both Grytviken/KEP and Leith, I estimated that there were probably 100, perhaps a few more, enemy at KEP, 70 of them being submariners. M Coy Gp were 250 miles away on RFA Tidespring, the ship having been ordered to clear the area by CTG when the submarine’s presence became known. Thus, they were out of the equation with no chance of using them for a quick landing. However, I was able to muster 75 men from all the military on Antrim including OC D Sqn, his small Sqn HQ, the Mountain Troop minus practically all their equipment, elements of M Coy Gp (Signallers, Mortar Fire Controllers (MFCs), Medical Officer (MO) and Petty Officer Medical Attendant (POMA) and one 81mm mortar and crew who were on Antrim, the small SBS detachment who had been advising me on 2 SBS activity, Antrim’s 10-man RM detachment which I had to lever hard for, and my own HQ element of signallers and NGSFO officers. These I formed into 3 small rifle troops of 20 men and nominated each to be commanded by OC D Sqn, Capt Nunn and Lt Grant respectively with myself in command of this ad-hoc small company (see copy of organisation produced by Capt Nunn a few days after the surrender available on request from the Editor).

By 1015 I had devised a fire plan with Lt Col Eve, my NGSFO adviser, using the twin 4.5-inch guns on Antrim and Plymouth to neutralise a Helicopter Landing Site (HLS) on Hestesletten and other vital ground in the environs of Brown Mountain, Grytviken and KEP (see copy of my Fire Plan available on request from the Editor). We were both supremely confident that the fire plan would make a devastating impression on the Argentines. Shortly after I went to report to CTG that I had a plan and a force on Antrim ready to land by helicopter as soon as was possible after the removal of all the electronic anti-submarine equipment from the Wessex and two Lynx. CTG delayed a decision until 1330 for the landings to go ahead with an H hour set at 1445. This frustrating delay which was created by CTG’s insistence on a debriefing after the helicopter attack on the Santa Fe, could have seriously compromised my plan because it had eaten into what daylight remained to execute the landings without the worst case anxiety of having to fight through the sprawling derelict whaling station of Grytviken in darkness.

My orders were simple and brief. I had planned two phases. Phase 1 was the landing of the complete ad-hoc company on Hestesletten - first troop in wave, the remainder in stream - followed by the seizure of Brown Mountain ridge. H hour would be when the first helicopter wave left Antrim. My naval gunfire plan was from H minus 10 to H plus 10 to neutralise the ridge and slopes of Brown Mountain which overlooked the HLS and H to H plus 5 to neutralise the HLS and then those two guns to be on call, directed from an airborne NGSFO officer, with the gun-line passing as much as possible directly over KEP from the ships out at sea and creeping closer to KEP with every shot so that fire could be directed into the Cove itself.

I selected the SAS to be the first troop to land in wave with specific orders to secure the landing site. Then Grant would arrive in stream with the 81mm mortar to establish a base plate position on the HLS and to support the SAS troop as it advanced across the plain to its objective, Brown Mountain Ridge. Almost every man in this ad-hoc company carried two 81mm mortar bombs that were to be dumped on the HLS accessible to the base plate position. Once Capt Nunn was established, the SAS orders were to advance to contact across the Hestesletten plain, cross the Penguin River to secure Brown Mountain Ridge. Meanwhile Lt Grant’s troop would land in stream and when complete at the HLS were to advance to pass through the SAS troop on the Ridge to advance to contact to Grytviken followed behind by Grant’s troop. My Tac HQ would land last.

The three helicopters were then to collect 2 SBS and two troops of D Sqn from Endurance and Plymouth to form Phase 2 of the landing (see copy of my signal orders for Phase 2 available on request from the Editor) – to land in the high ground to the North of and overlooking KEP with the mission to provide support for the advance of all troops across the very exposed slopes of Brown Mountain directly opposite and across the Cove from KEP. The helicopter landings and naval gunfire bombardment went perfectly and my Tactical HQ were the last to land on the HLS arriving at 1540.

Bottom to Top

Hestesletten, Brown Mountain and Ridge, KEP, Grytviken at the head of Cove, Maiviken – 21 April 2007

On arrival I found to my consternation that the SAS team were still on the landing site. In response to my frustration they suggested that there were enemy near the summit of Brown Mountain although no opposing fire had been brought down on them so far. After pointing out a rapid advance was crucial, this commenced but only after two Milan missiles were haphazardly fired towards the alleged positions. Subsequently rifle fire was directed towards a separate enemy seen near the Penguin River. Later the victims of that engagement were identified as elephant seals lying alongside the banks of that river. By now we were significantly behind time as almost an hour of precious daylight had been wasted.

Once the SAS were established on their objective, Brown Mountain Ridge, radio communication suddenly ceased just as white flags of surrender were seen fluttering from buildings in KEP. I moved forward myself together with my radio operator to notice that, contrary to instructions, a small group, including OC D Sqn, were leaving their objective and moving quickly towards Grytviken. After cancelling Phase 2 and calling for Antrim to steam into the bay, my immediate priority now lay in getting myself over to KEP while Captain Nunn led his troop through the SAS positions securing Brown Mountain Ridge and on towards the surrendering garrison. Together with my Medical Officer, Surgeon Lt Swinhoe, and his Petty Officer Medical Attendant, we were swiftly lifted by Wasp helicopter to the landing site in the centre of KEP. The enemy had assembled on the beach nearby and it was there I personally took the surrender of all Argentine forces from the Captain of the Santa Fe and the senior Argentine Marine Officer. Nightfall was just 10 minutes away.

Capt Nunn and his troop arrived shortly afterwards and he set about coordinating and consolidating the security of over 100 Argentine POWs and the overnight defence of KEP. Soon Lt Grant and his troop arrived in KEP followed lastly by the Mountain Troop of D Sqn. In the meantime at about 1830 I went to the radio shack at KEP taking with me Captain Bicain of the submarine, who spoke good English, and the senior Argentine Marine officer, a Major Lagos. There I told the Major through Bicain to call Leith, speak to Lt Astiz, the Argentine military commander, to tell him that he and all his forces at KEP had surrendered to an overwhelming British force and instructing him to do the same when British forces arrived at 1000 the following morning. The call was made, Astiz was told what I wanted and understood that if he resisted he would face serious consequences. (See copy of letter describing this incident available on request from the Editor.)

Not long after this I went aboard Antrim where I asked CTG if he would like to be briefed about our activities during and after the landing. Surprisingly, he was not interested. At the same time, I told him I had been on the radio to speak with Astiz at Leith and that the next task for him as CTG was to order Plymouth and Endurance, with their embarked SBS and two troops of D Sqn, to steam round to Leith during the night to take the surrender of Astiz and the scrap merchants the next morning. Because M Coy Gp were still 250 miles away out at sea on board RFA Tidespring, these embarked SBS and SAS men were the only military personnel available to go to Leith. CTG then entertained me to dinner together with the Captain of the submarine and the senior Argentine Marine officer. In the small hours the next morning Endurance and Plymouth steamed into Stromness Bay and the embarked troops landed to join the depleted Boat troop, now ashore on the mainland, to round up Astiz and all Argentine personnel at Leith. The surrender document of the Leith personnel was signed in the wardroom of Plymouth. South Georgia was back in British hands.

Apart from the unnecessary discharge of two Milan missiles and the killing of several elephant seals by the SAS, my force had not fired a single shot and no mortar bombs were launched. I was confident that the directed and accurate naval gunfire bombardment (269 4.5- inch shells were fired) with most of the shells passing over KEP had further demoralised the Argentine garrison and submarine crew to encourage their surrender. There were no friendly force casualties during the landings and no property had been damaged. On 26 April Captain Young sent for me and demanded immediate recommendations for gallantry. To his evident irritation my answer was that there would be none from me for anyone in the landing force as we had not come under fire at any point. Obviously, therefore, I had absolutely nothing to do with the relevant citations for Special Forces personnel which are reproduced below.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE 8th OCTOBER 1982

Extract 1

……..commanded D Squadron Special Air Service Regiment during a brilliantly successful series of operations carried out in South Georgia and the Falkland Islands. Both operations proved to be critically important to the conduct of the campaign.

In South Georgia his soldiers had to operate in extremes of climate which bordered on the limits of survivability. In spite of the difficulties…….was able to insert the necessary surveillance patrols into his area of responsibility overlooking Stromness Bay. This was achieved in spite of his patrols becoming involved in two helicopter crashes, and another losing half its strength when it was scattered into the night by 100 mph katabatic winds.

On 21 April (1) after the engagement of the enemy submarine Santa Fe,…….led his men into Cumberland East Bay and captured Grytviken employing two of his SAS troops (2). By his quick decisive action and personal display of courage, he was able to accomplish the fall of Grytviken without single loss of life. The next day he ordered his remaining troop to go ashore in Stromness Bay and accept the surrender of the remaining forces in South Georgia.

In all the operations described……. led his men coolly directing operations when under intensive fire from the enemy(3). He was an inspiration to his men and made a unique contribution to the overall success of operations in South Georgia…..

Extract 2

Having survived two helicopter crashes in appalling weather conditions on the Fortuna Glacier in South Georgia, two days later……..led the advance elements of the forces which captured the main enemy positions (4) in Grytviken. This action resulted in the total surrender of all enemy forces in South Georgia.

Extract 3

As a preliminary to the repossession of South Georgia it was essential to establish the enemy’s strength and dispositions. ……… troop were tasked to conduct the necessary close reconnaissance of Leith, Stromness and Husvik. The environment was harsh and despite the dispersion of his Gemini craft by fierce katabatic winds, he, through strength of character, successfully completed the task with a depleted force(5)

1. The landings were on 25 April 1982.

2. Only one troop (19 Troop - the Mountain Troop) and 4 men of D Sqn HQ (total 20 men from D Sqn) landed at Hestesletten on 25 April. No other D Sqn Troops landed that day.

3. There was no enemy fire whatsoever directed at the force at any time during the landings nor during the advance to King Edward Point.

4. There were no enemy positions on Hestesletten, on Brown Mountain, on Brown Mountain Ridge, on the exposed approaches to Grytviken, in the derelict whaling station of Grytviken nor on the approach track to King Edward Point. 19 (Mountain) Troop’s (SAS) objective was Brown Mountain Ridge some distance from Grytviken. They were the last personnel of my force to pass through Grytviken and to arrive at King Edward Point.

5. I received no information whatsoever on Argentine dispositions at Leith from this patrol before I had carried out the landings on Hestesletten, taken the surrender at King Edward Point and spoken through Captain Bicain with Captain Astiz at Leith from the radio shack at KEP. For this patrol’s task to be declared ‘successfully completed’ is a crude distortion.